I present an eavesdropping on the protocol proposed by W.-H. Kye, et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 040501 (2005)]. I show how an undetectable Eve can steal the whole information by labeling and then measuring the photons prepared by the user Alice.
In Ref. [1] it is described a novel three-way protocol for quantum key distribution, defined "blind" because it does not require the public revelation of the polarization bases; let me call it for ease KKKP, after the names of its inventors. One nice feature of KKKP is that the "control mode" present in Ping-Pong-like protocols is not necessary, because of the randomness of the traveling photons polarization. Unfortunately this same feature makes KKKP vulnerable to a number of attacks by an eavesdropper (Eve) whose aim is to steal information from Alice and Bob. As a consequence KKKP experienced a series of modifications [1, 2, 3] in order to improve its security without changing the philosophy of the scheme: the Impersonation attack [4] is avoided through the preparation of two pulses on Alice side followed, at a proper time, by a random blocking of one of the two, and through the addition of a random parameter on Bob side, the 'shuffling factor' s [1] . Notwithstanding, these changes alone are not sufficient to avert the attack, as noticed in [5] , and it was necessary to double the shuffling parameter in two, the shufflings s 1 and s 2 [3] . Finally, an eavesdropping resulting from the combination of Invisible-photon attack [6] and the PNS attack [7] can be avoided through a random check of the intensities of the beams by Alice and/or Bob [1, 2] .
In this Comment I show that despite the above modifications KKKP can still be attacked successfully without risk of detection. The main tool at Eve's disposal is what I call a "labeling-and-measure" strategy. It can be thought as a small shift of one of the involved photons' degree of freedom, like the wavelength for instance, in a way similar to what proposed by Cai in [6] . This makes the photons distinguishable to Eve, who can thus measure the relevant parameters of the communication.
In the three-way KKKP Alice prepares a photon in a polarization state |ψ 1 = cos θ |0 − sin θ |1 , choosing randomly the angle θ. Bob rotates the polarization of the received photon by applying the unitary operator U y (φ) = cos φ I − i sin φ σ y , with φ randomly chosen as well; then returns the photon to Alice. Alice applies the transformation U y (−θ + (−1) k π/4) to the photon, where k = 0, 1, thus removing the protection θ from the state, and encoding on it the key 'k'. In this way Bob, after compensating for his angle φ, can deterministically infer the key. In the stronger version of KKKP Alice sends two photons to Bob, with independent angles θ 1 and θ 2 . Bob executes U y (φ + (−1) s1 π/4) on the first and U y (φ + (−1) s2 π/4) on the second, and returns them to Alice. Alice adds the key as before, but she also blocks one of the two pulses according to the value 0 or 1 of the 'blocking factor' b. Then, after removing any temporal label from the resulting photon, she forwards it to Bob, who measures it as before. Afterward, Alice's public disclosure of b allows Bob to reconstruct the key. To this stronger version of KKKP I add also the random control on the intensity of the beams during the protocol, by Alice and/or Bob, and call this final version KKKP. Now I describe the label-and-measure eavesdropping on KKKP. For explicative purposes the label I use is the wavelength of the photons. However any other degree of freedom different from the polarization (e.g. the momentum direction, an eventual phase respect to a reference signal, the temporal distribution, etc.) can be used as a label by Eve, and constitutes a loophole of the protocol.
Let us suppose, like in the Impersonation attack, that there are Eve1, who impersonates Bob to Alice, and Eve2, who impersonates Alice to Bob. The hard work is made by Eve1, who steals both the key k and the block factor b from Alice. In KKKP Alice sends out the pulses θ 1 and θ 2 at a certain wavelength λ. Eve1 chooses randomly one of the two photons, say the first one (p1), and shifts its wavelength into λ 1 = λ + δ, while leaving the second (p2) unchanged. δ is a quantity different from zero whose smallness depends on Eve1's technology, which one must assume to be infinite, or at least greater than Alice and Bob's one. According to the protocol, Alice performs the operations
and U y (−θ 2 + (−1) k π/4) on p2. Then she blocks one of the two photons, say p2, and forwards p1, after delaying it properly to make it undistinguishable in time from p2. It is straightforward to see that from Alice side exits only p1 in the state:
where the wavelength is indicated together with the polarization state. Note that the protection θ 1 has been removed from p1 by Alice through her last transformations. By measuring the wavelength and the polarization of the photon in the state (1) Eve1 can infer which pulse was blocked, i.e. the blocking factor b, and the value of k. These two values are accordingly used by Eve2 on a pair of fake pulses sent to Bob, in order to mimic to him the presence of Alice. Since the imitation is perfect Bob has no chance to unveil the attack. Let me point out that although I described the eavesdropping as two separate temporal sequences it is on the contrary important that Eve1 and Eve2 act in synchronization in the following way: 1. Eve1 modifies p1 and stores p1 and p2 2. Eve2 sends a pair of fake pulses to Bob 3. when Eve2 receives back the two fake pulses from Bob Eve1 forwards to Alice the two photons she stored 4. ...and so on. This makes the usage of public receipts of the photons by Alice and Bob ineffective against Eve. Finally, a control of the intensity of the beams is clearly useless in this case since the intensity is not altered by Eve.
In conclusion I showed an explicit label-and-measure eavesdropping against the stronger version of the KKKP protocol [1] , illustrated by a simple wavelength shift of one of the photons prepared by Alice. This attack provides Eve with a complete knowledge of the exchanged information, without the possibility by Alice and Bob of detect her presence. The insertion of (wavelength) filters in analogy with what proposed in [6] does not work in this case because there is no polarization detections during the protocol. Nevertheless, the introduction of polarization controls along the channels of KKKP is not simple, just because of the randomness of the polarization bases.
The solution of the problem should include the Alice removal of all potential Eve's labels. Perhaps Alice could use the teleportation process to transfer the polarization state of the unblocked photon on another photon whose degrees of freedom are not controlled by Eve. Despite its practical difficulty this solution seems to be not outside the range of current technology.
